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The performance of the U.S. economy between 1994 and 1998 has been superb. Real GDP growth has
averaged over 3 percent per year. Unemployment has fallen from 6.6 percent in January 1994 to 4.5 percent in
June 1998. The change in the consumer price index for urban consumers has averaged below 3 percent per
year. These solid economic fundamentals have been accompanied by booming asset prices. Between January
1994 and June 1998 the Standard & Poors' 500 Index has appreciated almost 150 percent. Since March 1997
bond prices have been steadily increasing (and yields decreasing), producing the lowest yields ever in July
1998 on 30-year Treasury securities.
The Economist  magazine argues that the Federal Reserve should depress economic activity and lower asset
prices. Stock prices have grown too much, it claims, along with the prices of real estate and works of art. In
addition, The Economist  contends that the M3 money supply has grown too fast this year. It is concerned
either that stock prices will fall quickly, destroying wealth, or that capital gains will increase spending and lead
"inevitably" to inflation. The Economist  (16 May 1998, p. 83) suggests that "it would take a substantial rise in
rates-which of course would result in a sharply slowed economy-to change investors expectations" and thus
lower stock prices.
While sharp drops in stock prices can hurt the economy, there are several problems with these arguments.
First, the Fed is legally mandated to consider employment, prices, and interest rates. All of these variables are
performing well. The Fed should not "sharply" slow the economy to stabilize the prices of stocks and works of
art unless Congress extends the Fed's mandate to include these variables. Second, unstable velocity in recent
years has caused most economists to downplay the importance of money supply changes. Third, few causal
links in economics are "inevitable." While higher stock prices may lead to more spending, it is not clear how
large this effect is. While more spending may in turn lead to higher inflation, it is not clear this must happen. A
recent series of papers published in the Winter 1997 Journal of Economic Perspectives  presents evidence that
an increase in spending may sometimes but certainly not inevitably lead to higher inflation. Fourth, a
substantial rise in rates would have adverse distributional effects, harming those most who have profited the
least from the stock market's recent rise. It is this fourth issue that this paper focuses on. 
In an earlier paper Thorbecke (1997) considered the distributional effects of disinflationary monetary policy.
He argued that in theory monetary policy should have its largest effect on interest-sensitive industries such as
construction and durable goods. He discussed how these effects can be amplified if monetary policy affects
firms' access to credit. He also presented theoretical reasons why the burden of monetary policy should fall on
low-income individuals and minorities. Finally he reported evidence indicating that the brunt of monetary
policy falls on low- income, urban workers.
This paper presents further evidence on the distributional effects of monetary policy. As discussed below,
evidence that monetary policy matters comes from the identified vector autoregression methodology of
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996), the narrative approach of
Friedman and Schwartz (1963), and the investigation of disinflationary periods by Romer and Romer (1989).
This paper identifies monetary policy shocks using all three approaches. The effect of disinflationary policy
measured in these three ways on economic variables is then examined. A Social Accounting Matrix is also
employed to investigate the distributional effects of monetary policy. The results indicate that monetary policy
disproportionately burdens interest-sensitive industries, blue-collar workers, urban employees, and minorities.The next section discusses the methodology used in this paper. This is followed by evidence of the effects of
contractionary monetary policy on industries, factors of production, and households. The last section
concludes.
Methodology 
Identifying Monetary Policy Shocks
Most economists agree that in the short run monetary policy can be an important source of economic
fluctuations.1 As Bernanke and Gertler (1995) discuss, this belief is supported by the vector autoregression
evidence of Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996), the narrative study of
Friedman and Schwartz (1963), and the evidence from disinflationary periods presented in Romer and Romer
(1989). Monetary policy shocks are identified in this paper using all three approaches. 
Vector Autoregression Evidence
Vector autoregressions (VARs) are discussed in Thorbecke (1997). There he uses impulse-response functions
from a VAR to measure the effects of monetary policy. The impulse-response approach involves calculating
unexpected changes in monetary policy in month t and noting the predicted effects on employment and other
variables in months t, t+1, t+2, etc. To measure unexpected changes in monetary policy a method similar to that
employed by Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996) can be used. They
measure monetary policy by unexpected changes in the federal funds rate. The funds rate, the rate on one-day
interbank loans, has often been used as the Fed's instrument in implementing monetary policy. Christiano et
al.  note that including an index of sensitive commodity prices along with variables such as GDP and the GDP
deflator in a prediction equation for the funds rate produces a credible measure of monetary policy in that it is
correlated in the expected way with variables such as bank reserves, real GDP, employment, and prices.
Following their approach unexpected changes in the federal funds rate are calculated by regressing the funds
rate on a constant, six lags of itself, and six lags of aggregate industrial production growth, the inflation rate, the
log of a commodity price index, the log of nonborrowed reserves, the log of total reserves, and the log of
employment. The portion of the funds rate that can not be predicted using these variables (the residual) is
treated as the unexpected change in the funds rate. The predicted responses of employment and other variables
to these funds rate shocks are noted. More information on the procedure, including data sources, is presented
in the Thorbecke (1997).
Narrative Evidence
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) wrote a classic work employing the narrative approach to examining the effects
of monetary policy. Their strategy involves "examining a wide range of qualitative evidence" to "discern the
antecedent circumstances whence arose the particular movements that become so anonymous when we feed the
statistics into the computer."2 They thus identify exogenous changes in monetary policy using historical
analysis and note whether real variables are affected. This paper attempts to follow Friedman and Schwartz
(1963) by constructing a narrative history of recent disinflationary periods. As Ball (1994) discusses, there are
two recent episodes during which the Fed tightened monetary policy in order to substantially lower trend
inflation. These periods began in 1974 and 1979. In both cases the policy shifts were followed by severe
recessions. These episodes are discussed below.
Disinflationary Monetary Policy in 1974-75
Monetary policy in 1974 was influenced by the oil embargo that lasted from October 1973 to March 1974 and
by inflationary pressures. As the Economic Report of the President  (1975) discusses, monetary policy eased
over this period to offset the uncertainties arising from the embargo. With the end of the embargo in March
1974 and the lifting of wage and price controls in April the Fed shifted its emphasis to fighting inflation. Over
the second and third quarters of 1974 it focused on slowing the growth rate of the money supply. Modigliani
and Papademos (1975) discuss how this strategy led to excessively contractionary policy because the
preliminary estimates the Fed was responding to overstated money growth by 2.1 percentage points. For the
year 1974 M1 grew by only 4.6 percent, far below the target of 6 percent that the Fed had set at the beginningof the year (see the Economic Report of the President , 1974). By reducing money supply growth so much the
Fed caused the funds rate to rise by more than 450 basis points between March and July. Bernanke, Gertler,
and Watson (1997), using impulse-response techniques from a vector autoregression, find that this funds rate
increase is explained mainly by inflationary concerns (as measured by an increase in commodity prices).
Other interest rates rose along with the funds rate, contributing to a slowdown in interest- sensitive sectors and
to a recession. The prime rate rose almost 400 basis points between March and July and commercial paper
rates rose almost 350 basis points. Mortgage rates between March and the end of the year rose by almost 100
basis points. These higher interest rates decimated the housing industry. The Economic Report of the
President  (1975) describes how housing activity appeared to rebound in the Spring of 1974. The historically
high interest rates in July, though, aborted this recovery. The high interest rates prompted funds to flow out of
accounts at thrift institutions and into higher yielding assets. This process of disintermediation restricted new
mortgage commitments, causing housing starts to tumble. According to Modigliani and Papademos (1975) one
half of the decline in GNP during the recessionary year of 1974 can be explained by declines in housing
investment. The other sector experiencing a major decline was durable goods. Real output in this sector
declined 9 percent in 1974, with most of the decline coming in the fourth quarter.
The Fed did succeed at bringing inflation down. As Ball (1994) discusses, between 1974 and 1976 trend
inflation (measured by the change in the consumer price index) declined 4 percentage points. Below the
responses of employment and unemployment over this period are examined.
The Volcker Disinflation
The period from 1979 to 1982 that economists call the "Volcker disinflation" is the clearest recent example of a
disinflation in the U.S. In October 1979, with inflation exceeding 10% and the unemployment rate at 6%, Fed
Chairman Paul Volcker declared his commitment to reducing money supply growth in order to fight inflation.
Although M1 had grown at an annual rate of 9% in the first three quarters of 1979, the policy reversal
beginning in the fourth quarter reduced the overall growth rate in 1979 to 7.9%. M1 then grew 7.3% in 1980
and 5.1% in 1981. In 1982, it grew at a 4.6% annual rate for the first two quarters before the Fed abandoned
M1 growth targets in the second half of the year.3 This monetary contraction was associated with an increase
of 800 basis points in the federal funds rate and of about 500 basis points in long-term Treasury and corporate
bond yields. 
Many economists believe that the slower money supply growth rates and higher interest rates helped spark the
two recessions that occurred between 1979 and 1982. As the Economic Report of the President  (1982)
discusses, two interest-sensitive sectors, residential investment and consumer durables, showed the largest
declines in 1980 and 1981. The Economic Report  attributes these declines to the high interest rates and
resulting high cost of credit during these years.As economic activity slowed, inflation did decline. Ball (1994)
discusses how trend inflation in the U.S. (measured by the change in the consumer price index) declined 8
percentage points between 1979 and 1982. Below the responses of employment and unemployment over this
period are examined.
Evidence from the Romer and Romer Approach
Romer and Romer (1989), in an influential study, isolate disinflationary episodes after World War II. They
treat the disinflations as exogenous events and note the responses of unemployment and industrial production.
To identify episodes when the Fed switched to disinflationary policy, they examine the minutes of the Federal
Open Market Committee meetings. They choose dates when the Fed attempted to create a recession to reduce
inflation. In the original paper they note six dates. In a later paper (Romer and Romer, 1994) they add one
more recent date.4 In their econometric work they represent these dates using dummy variables. They include
the dummy variables in univariate autoregressions of unemployment and industrial production. They find that
unemployment is higher than forecasted and unemployment lower than forecasted following disinflationary
episodes.
Their approach can be used to investigate the effect of monetary policy on economic variables. In doing this the
model estimated in this paper has the form:ut = A(L)ut-1 + B(L) t-1 + C(L)Dt-1
where ut represents the variable (e.g., unemployment) under consideration, A(L) and B(L) are unrestricted
polynomials in the lag operator L,  t is the change in the consumer price index for urban consumers, C(L) is
estimated as a fourth-order polynomial distributed lag, and Dt represents dummy variables for the Romer dates
and t is a mean-zero error term. Following Shapiro (1994), inflation is included as an explanatory variable and
the A(L) and B(L) polynomials contain 7 lags. To be consistent with the vector autoregression work, C(L)
includes 48 lags.
An effort is made to correct for trends. Employment for almost all industries examined has a clear upward
trend. The log of employment is thus regressed on a constant and a linear time trend. The residual from this
regression is then used as the variable under consideration in equation (1). Unemployment rates do not exhibit
clear trends over the sample period. Thus unemployment rates are estimated in levels, but to check for
robustness the equations are re-estimated with unemployment rates that are alternatively detrended and
first-differenced. 
A General Equilibrium Approach to Analyze Distributional Issues
Thorbecke (1992) has argued that it is desirable to take account of general equilibrium interactions when
considering distributional effects. For instance, if contractionary monetary policy causes a slowdown in
construction, spending on intermediate inputs such as wood products will decline, decreasing the incomes of
factors involved in the wood industry. These decreases in the incomes of factors employed in producing wood
will decrease the incomes of socioeconomic groups such as the rural workers. As the incomes of groups such
as these decline, spending on commodities such as pickup trucks will decline, depressing output in the
automotive sector. This decline in output will decrease the incomes of factors such as production workers, thus
reducing the incomes of socioeconomic groups such as urban workers. This in turn will depress their
expenditures on commodities such as consumer durables. The cycle continues as the output of durable goods
and the incomes of factors producing durables decline.
To capture these interdependencies and to measure the total effect of an exogenous decline in sectoral output
on the incomes of factors and socioeconomic groups a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) is useful. A SAM is
a disaggregated general equilibrium accounting framework that seeks to model the interdependencies
characterizing an economy at a given time. This paper employs the SAM of Roland-Holst and Sancho (1992)
to examine the effect of declines in sectoral output due to contractionary monetary policy on factorial and
household income distribution. Their SAM has 56 categories, including 10 production sectors, 6 occupational
groups, and 4 household types. 
Consistent with a general equilibrium perspective, this paper considers first the effects of disinflationary policy
on industries, then on factors, and finally on households. Evidence from VARs, disinflationary periods, the
Romer and Romer approach, and SAMs are combined to try to shed light on the distributional effects of
disinflationary policy. 
Evidence on the Effects of Disinflationary Monetary Policy 
The Effects on Industries  
Table 1 reproduces evidence from impulse-response functions presented in Thorbecke (1997).5 It presents the
responses of employment after 18 months by industry to an unexpected increase in the funds rate. For all the
industries examined the response peaked after about 18 months. The two sectors that are most harmed are
construction and durable goods. As discussed above, these are sectors that one would expect to be affected by
monetary policy because they are interest-sensitive. For construction, an unexpected increase in the federal
funds rate of one-standard-deviation (equal to 0.55 percentage points) decreases employment after 18 months
by an average of 0.7 percent. For durable manufacturing, an unexpected funds rate increase of 0.55 percentage
points decrease employment after 18 months on average by 0.5 percent. Table 2 will provide some perspectiveon these numbers by noting how much employment in these industries fell during the 1974-5 and 1979-1982
disinflations. Table 1 further indicates that employment in sectors such as nondurable goods, government,
transportation, and mining are barely affected. The results thus indicate that contractionary monetary policy
disproportionately affects employment in sectors such as construction and durable goods. 
Table 2 shows the decline in sectoral employment during the two recent disinflations. The results show that the
only sectors experiencing double-digit declines in employment were the construction and durable goods
industries. Employment in construction fell 17.1 percent during the 1974-5 recession and 14.6 percent during
the 1979-82 recessions. Employment in durable manufacturing fell 12.9 percent during the 1974-5 recession
and 18.3 percent during the 1979-82 recessions. The only other sectors whose employment fell close to this
amount were nondurable goods and transportation. Employment in nondurable manufacturing employment fell
7.9 percent during the 1974-5 recession and increased 4.2 percent during the 1979-82 recessions. Employment
in the transportation sector fell 4.4 percent during the 1974-5 recession and 3.1 percent during the 1979-82
recessions. Thus this evidence indicates that the brunt of these disinflations fell on workers in durable
manufacturing and construction.
Table 3 reports evidence from estimating equation (1). It presents the maximal responses of employment to
contractionary policy as measured by the Romer and Romer (1994) dates. All the responses are negative,
indicating that contractionary monetary policy depresses employment. The most affected sectors are durable
manufacturing, with a value of -0.0022, construction, with a value of -0.0027, and mining, with a value of
-0.00393.
The evidence for construction and durable goods is consistent with the results reported in Tables 1 and 2,
although the results for mining are not. Tables 1 and 2 indicate that the construction and durable goods sectors
are disproportionately burdened by disinflations. However, those Tables contain no evidence that mining is
affected. It is possible that the positive results for mining in Table 3 are due to sampling error. Alternatively the
results could be due to the fact that mining is affected by monetary policy. In any case, employment in the
mining sector is an order of magnitude smaller than employment in construction or durable manufacturing.6
Thus in the Social Accounting Matrix analysis below it will be assumed that construction and durable
manufacturing are the key sectors harmed by contractionary policy. Since mining is a small sector ignoring it
should not alter the results much.
The Effects on Factors
The SAM framework makes it possible to map changes in sectoral output onto changes in factorial income.
The focus in this paper is on labor. Labor is disaggregated according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics
occupational categories.
Table 4 reports the effect of a 10 percent decline in output in construction and durable goods on the incomes of
different occupations. For both industries, blue-collar workers are hit the hardest. In durable goods,
lower-skilled blue-collar workers employed as "laborers" are harmed the most, suffering a 7 percent decline in
income. In construction, more skilled blue-collar workers employed in "crafts" are hurt more, suffering a 1.3
percent decline in income. Thus, if disinflationary monetary policy causes a slowdown in construction and
durable goods, blue-collar workers will be disproportionately burdened.
The Effects on Households
It is also important to consider the effect of monetary policy on households (socioeconomic groups). The
Social Accounting Matrix of Sanchez and Roland-Holst (1992) disaggregates households into white rural,
white urban, nonwhite rural, and nonwhite urban. The SAM framework can be used to map changes in sectoral
output onto changes in household income.
Table 5 reports the effect of a 10 percent decline in output in construction and durable goods on household
incomes. For both industries, urban households are hurt much more than rural households. The effects on
whites and nonwhites appear similar.One drawback with the SAM approach is that it can only capture the effects of a downturn in one sector at a
time. If it were used to measure simultaneous downturns in several sectors, it would double-count the
interactions. The VAR, narrative, and Romer and Romer approaches, on the other hand, can be used to measure
the aggregate effects of a disinflation on households. Evidence from these three techniques on the effects of
monetary policy on households is presented below.
The effect on households can be measured by the unemployment rate. Monthly data on unemployment for
white, black, and Hispanic households are available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) beginning in
1973. Data on unemployment for white and nonwhite households are available from BLS beginning in 1954.
Data on household unemployment rates are thus readily available. Unemployment rates by race are closely
correlated with income levels and other measures of welfare. Thus changes in unemployment can be used to
infer how much a given household group is suffering from disinflationary policy. 
Figure 1 presents the results from an impulse-response function. It shows the effect of a one-standard
deviation unexpected increase in the funds rate on unemployment by race. A one-standard deviation shock in
this case equals about 55 basis points. For all three races unemployment increases following the contractionary
shock. Although standard error bands are not included, all three responses are statistically significant at the 5
percent level.7 The maximal effect on unemployment occurs one to two years after the tightening. The results
indicate that a 55 basis point unexpected increase in the funds rate raises white unemployment by 0.09
percentage points, Hispanic unemployment by 0.17 percentage points, and black unemployment by 0.14
percentage points.8 The evidence in Figure 1 indicates that minorities are harmed more than whites by
contractionary monetary policy. Some perspective will be provided on the magnitude of these numbers below
when discussing how much unemployment rates increased during recent disinflations.
One way to formally test for differential effects of monetary policy is to include the differences in
unemployment rates between races rather than the level of the unemployment rate by race in the VAR. Figures
2 and 3 present the results from doing this. Figure 2 plots the response of the difference between the Hispanic
and white unemployment rates to a one-standard deviation funds rate shock. One-standard error bands are also
included. The Figure indicates that point estimates of the differential response become one-standard error
greater than zero after 7 months. The response peaks after 14 months at 0.06, indicating that a 55 basis point
increase in the funds rate raises the difference between the Hispanic and white unemployment rates by 0.06
percentage points. The p-value (two-tailed test) associated with this coefficient is 0.01. Figure 3 plots the
response of the difference between the black and white unemployment rates to a one-standard deviation funds
rate shock. The Figure indicates that point estimates of the differential response become one-standard error
greater than zero after 9 months. The response peaks after 20 months at 0.05, indicating that a 55 basis point
increase in the funds rate raises the difference between the black and white unemployment rates by 0.05
percentage points. The p-value (two-tailed test) associated with this coefficient is 0.085. Thus these results
indicate that minorities are harmed more than whites by disinflationary policy.
The same results are obtained when examining the change in unemployment by race during recent
disinflations. Figure 4 plots unemployment by race during the 1974-5 disinflation. For all three races
unemployment began increasing in the summer of 1974 and peaked in the first half of 1975. The white
unemployment rate increased 3.4 percentage points over this period, the Hispanic rate 6.2 percentage points,
and the black rate 5.4 percentage points. At their peaks white unemployment reached 8.4 percent, Hispanic
unemployment reached 14.3 percent, and black unemployment reached 15.3 percent. Figure 5 plots
unemployment by race during the 1979-82 disinflation. For all three races unemployment began increasing
near the end of 1979 and peaked at the end of 1982. The white unemployment rate increased 4.5 percentage
points over this period, the Hispanic rate 8.1 percentage points, and the black rate 9.5 percentage points. At
their peaks white unemployment reached 9.7 percent, Hispanic unemployment reached 15.7 percent, and black
unemployment reached 21.2 percent. Thus black unemployment increased more than twice as much as white
unemployment over this period and peaked at levels greater than twice as high. Minorities clearly paid a greater
cost than whites for the disinflation. 
The Romer and Romer approach also yields similar results. In order to use as many of the Romer dates as
possible, unemployment data disaggregated into white and nonwhite categories rather than into white, black,
and Hispanic categories are employed. As discussed above the former data are available beginning in January1954 and the latter beginning in March 1973.
Table 6 presents the results from estimating Equation (1). For nonwhites the responses of unemployment to a
disinflationary episode peaks at 0.199 while for whites it peaks at 0.046. This implies that a contractionary
monetary shock raises the nonwhite unemployment rate on average by 0.199 percentage points and the white
unemployment rate by 0.046 percentage points. The results are similar when the levels of the unemployment
rates are replaced in the regressions by rates that are detrended or first-differenced.
Table 6 also presents the results from including the differences in unemployment rates between races rather
than the level of the unemployment rate by race in equation (4). This difference peaks at 0.266, implying that a
disinflationary episode raises the difference between the nonwhite and white unemployment rates by 0.266
percentage points. The p-value (two-tailed test) associated with this coefficient is less than 0.0001. This
evidence indicates that minorities are harmed more than whites by disinflationary policy.
Conclusion
The United States economy has performed exceptionally well over the last 5 years. Stock and bond prices have
also increased steadily. The Economist  argues that the Federal Reserve must push stock prices down and
slow the U.S. economy, perhaps "sharply." One factor that the magazine does not discuss is the distributional
effects of such a policy. Who would pay the costs for depressing asset prices? Evidence in this paper indicates
that the construction and durable goods industries, blue-collar workers, urban employees, and minorities would
be disproportionately burdened by contractionary monetary policy.
In the case of minorities, the differential effects are particularly striking. Impulse-response functions from a
vector autoregression indicate that positive innovations in the federal funds rate increase unemployment among
blacks and Hispanics by 50-90 percent more than among whites. Examination of historical episodes of
disinflationary policy shows that unemployment among minorities increases almost twice as much as among
whites. Estimation using the Romer dates 
reveals that anti-inflationary policy shocks increase unemployment among nonwhites more than twice as much
as it does among whites. Thus the brunt of disinflationary policy falls on minorities.
On the other hand, minority households would not share proportionately in the benefit of keeping the stock
market stable. The Economic Report of the President  (1998) reports that only 5 percent of black families
possess stocks, mutual funds, or pension funds. For white families, more than 25 percent possess these assets.
Thus stable stock prices, while desirable, would in the first instance benefit whites much more than minorities.
Before the Fed accepts the advice of The Economist  and slows the economy down in order to lower the prices
of stocks, real estate, and works of art, there should be open debate in Congress that these variables are
important goals of monetary policy. Currently the Fed is mandated to seek maximum employment, commodity
price stability, and moderate long-term interest rates. It is meeting these goals exceptionally well. While it is
always possible that higher stock prices can lead to inflation or lower stock prices to recession, these links are
tenuous and uncertain. The Fed should not "sharply" slow the economy to stabilize asset prices unless
Congress extends the Fed's mandate to include these variables. If Congress does debate this issue, it should
take into account that the individuals most likely to be hurt by deflating asset prices are the ones least likely to








Durable Goods -12.9 -18.3
Finance, Insurance,
Real Estate 0.5 6.9
Government 4.4 -1.3
Mining 8.8 4.5
Nondurable Goods -7.9 4.2
Retail Trade 1.3 1.8
Services 4.8 11.0
Transportation -4.4 -3.1
Wholesale Trade -0.3 -0.5
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Note: For the 1974-5 disinflation, the change is calculated from April 1974 to July 1975. For
the 1979-82 disinflation, the change is calculated from September 1979 to December 1982. 
Table 1: Impulse Response of Sectoral Employment after 18 Months to
One-Standard Deviation Shock to the Federal Funds Rate 
Sector
Response to One-Standard
Deviation Shock to FF (Std. Error)
Construction -0.00693*  (0.00235)
Durable Goods -0.00491** (0.00169)
Finance, Insurance,
Real Estate -0.00182** (0.00070)
Government -0.00090*  (0.00054)
Mining 0.000701   (0.00307)
Nondurable Goods -0.00110*  (0.00072)
Retail Trade -0.00261** (0.00076)
Services -0.00151** (0.00057)
Transportation -0.00086   (0.00085)
Wholesale Trade -0.00241** (0.00080)
*Significant at the 10% level.
**Significant at the 5% level. Table 6: Response of Unemployment by Race
Following Romer Episodes 
Independent Nonwhite White Difference between
Nonwhite and White




  (Percent Decline in Income)
White Rural 1.0 0.2
White Urban 3.1 0.5
Nonwhite Rural 1.3 0.2
Nonwhite Urban 3.0 0.5
Source: Social Accounting Matrix presented in Roland-Holst and Sancho (1992) 




  (Percent Decline in Income)
Executive, Administrative, and Managerial 3.8 0.6
Technical, Sales, and Administrative Support 3.9 0.6
Service 2.5 0.4
Farming, Forestry, and Fishing 2.5 0.6
Precision Production, Craft, and Repair 4.6 1.3
Operators, Fabricators, and Laborers 7.0 0.9
Source: Social Accounting Matrix presented in Roland-Holst and Sancho (1992) 






Construction -0.00273 (0.00182) 24
Durable Goods -0.00220* (0.00115) 15
Finance, Insurance,
Real Estate -0.00024 (0.00020) 24
Government -0.00105** (0.0004) 26
Mining -0.00393 (0.00415) 48
Nondurable Goods -0.00015 (0.00037) 36
Retail Trade -0.00081* (0.00055) 14
Services -0.00082** (0.00032) 24
Transportation -0.00145* (0.0078) 27
Wholesale Trade -0.00039 (0.00036) 18
*Significant at the 10% level.
**Significant at the 5% level. Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Romer0 -0.058 -0.39 -0.034 -0.60 -0.036 -0.26
Romer-1 -0.034 -0.28 -0.027 -0.57 -0.009 -0.08
Romer-2 -0.014 -0.13 -0.019 -0.48 0.012 0.13
Romer-3 0.004 0.04 -0.013 -0.34 0.028 0.32
Romer-4 0.019 0.20 -0.006 -0.18 0.040 0.48
Romer-5 0.031 0.34 -0.001 -0.02 0.049 0.59
Romer-6 0.042 0.45 0.005 0.13 0.054 0.65
Romer-7 0.051 0.54 0.009 0.26 0.057 0.68
Romer-8 0.059 0.62 0.014 0.38 0.059 0.69
Romer-9 0.065 0.69 0.018 0.49 0.059 0.70
Romer-10 0.070 0.76 0.021 0.60 0.058 0.69
Romer-11 0.075 0.83 0.025 0.71 0.056 0.69
Romer-12 0.080 0.91 0.028 0.82 0.054 0.69
Romer-13 0.084 0.98 0.030 0.93 0.053 0.69
Romer-14 0.088 1.07 0.033 1.03 0.052 0.70
Romer-15 0.092 1.15 0.035 1.13 0.051 0.72
Romer-16 0.096 1.23 0.037 1.22 0.052 0.75
Romer-17 0.100 1.31 0.038 1.30 0.053 0.79
Romer-18 0.105 1.39 0.040 1.37 0.056 0.84
Romer-19 0.110 1.48 0.041 1.42 0.061 0.92
Romer-20 0.115 1.56 0.042 1.47 0.066 1.01
Romer-21 0.121 1.65 0.043 1.51 0.073 1.12
Romer-22 0.127 1.74 0.044 1.55 0.082 1.26
Romer-23 0.133 1.84 0.045 1.58 0.092 1.43
Romer-24 0.140 1.96 0.045 1.62 0.103 1.63
Romer-25 0.147 2.09 0.045 1.65 0.116 1.86
Romer-26 0.154 2.23 0.046 1.69 0.129 2.12
Romer-27 0.161 2.38 0.046 1.73 0.144 2.41
Romer-28 0.169 2.55 0.046 1.77 0.159 2.73
Romer-29 0.175 2.71 0.045 1.81 0.174 3.08
Romer-30 0.182 2.86 0.045 1.84 0.189 3.42
Romer-31 0.187 2.99 0.045 1.84 0.205 3.74
Romer-32 0.192 3.07 0.044 1.83 0.219 4.02
Romer-33 0.196 3.10 0.043 1.79 0.232 4.22
Romer-34 0.198 3.08 0.042 1.73 0.244 4.33Romer-35 0.199 3.01 0.041 1.65 0.254 4.37
Romer-37 0.194 2.76 0.039 1.46 0.266 4.25
Romer-38 0.188 2.60 0.037 1.36 0.266 4.13
Romer-39 0.179 2.43 0.035 1.28 0.262 3.98
Romer-40 0.166 2.24 0.033 1.20 0.253 3.81
Romer-41 0.150 2.02 0.031 1.12 0.238 3.59
Romer-42 0.129 1.78 0.029 1.05 0.217 3.31
Romer-43 0.104 1.45 0.026 0.96 0.189 2.91
Romer-44 0.074 1.02 0.023 0.84 0.152 2.33
Romer-45 0.038 0.50 0.020 0.68 0.106 1.54
Romer-46 -0.004 -0.04 0.016 0.48 0.051 0.65
Romer-47 -0.052 -0.50 0.012 0.30 -0.015 -0.16
Romer-48 -0.108 -0.82 0.007 0.15 -0.094 -0.78
Unemployment-1 0.728 15.43 0.933 19.80 0.521 11.09
Unemployment-2 0.315 5.44 0.265 4.11 0.276 5.21
Unemployment-3 -0.023 -0.39 -0.079 -1.22 0.004 11.1
Unemployment-4 -0.037 -0.62 -0.004 -0.06 -0.015 -0.28
Unemployment-5 0.094 1.58 -0.125 -1.92 0.118 2.18
Unemployment-6 -0.143 -2.49 0.012 0.20 -0.042 -0.80
Unemployment-7 0.036 0.77 -0.030 -0.66 0.094 2.02
Inflation-1 5.363 0.53 5.703 1.46 3.398 0.37
Inflation-2 -0.338 -0.03 1.608 0.40 -0.245 -0.03
Inflation-3 12.13 1.13 2.525 0.62 11.717 1.20
Inflation-4 -13.56 -1.26 4.855 1.19 -16.588 -1.70
Inflation-5 12.33 1.15 6.945 1.70 1.922 0.20
Inflation-6 -0.35 -0.03 -5.980 -1.47 1.430 0.15
Inflation-7 3.98 0.38 -7.018 -1.76 9.109 0.97
Constant 0.21 1.98 0.106 2.60 0.144 1.63
Adjusted R2 0.97 0.98 0.92
S.E. of
Regression 0.46 0.18 0.42
Note:  The Table presents the results from regressing unemployment disaggregated by race
on 7 own lags, 7 lags of the inflation rate, and 48 lags of the Romer dates. The sample period
is 1954:1 to 1996:12. 
Figure 1. The Effect of Positive Orthogonalized Innovations in the Federal Funds
Rate on Unemployment by Race 
Note:  The estimated impulse-response functions are calculated from VARs that include industrial production
growth, inflation, an index of sensitive commodity prices, unemployment disaggregated by race (either white,
black, or Hispanic), the federal funds rate, nonborrowed reserves, and total reserves. The sample period is from
September 1973 to December 1996.  
Figure 2. The Effect of Positive Orthogonalized Innovations in the Federal Funds
Rate on the Difference Between the Hispanic and White Unemployment Rates 
Note:  The estimated impulse-response functions are calculated from VARs that include industrial production
growth, inflation, an index of sensitive commodity prices, the difference between the Hispanic and white
unemployment rates, the federal funds rate, nonborrowed reserves, and total reserves. Dashed lines represent
one-standard error bands. The sample period is from September 1973 to December 1996.  
Figure 3. The Effect of Positive Orthogonalized Innovations in the Federal Fund Rate
on the Difference Between the Black and White Unemployment Rates 
Note: The estimated impulse-response functions are calculated from VARs that include industrial production
growth, inflation, an index fo sensitive commodity prices, the difference between black and white
unemployment rates, the federal funds rate, nonborrowed reserves, and total reserves. Dashed lines represent
one-standard error bands. The sample period is from September 1973 to December 1996.  
Figure 4. Unemployment by race During the 1974 Disinflation 
Source: Haver Analytics database  
Figure 5. Unemployment by Race During the 1979-1982 Disinflation 
Source: Haver Analytics database 
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Notes 
1. An additional reason why minorities may be harmed more during disinflationary periods is the fact
that they are often the last to be hired and the first to be fired. 
2. The May 1997 American Economic Review (pp. 230-246) contains articles by a panel of
distinguished macro economists addressing the question of whether there is a practical core of
macroeconomics that we should all believe. All the panel members agreed that one element of the core
is the proposition that in the short run monetary policy can affect the real economy. The panel
members were Olivier Blanchard, Alan Blinder, Martin Eichenbaum, Robert Solow, and John Taylor. 
3. Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 686). 
4. These data are taken from Friedman (1988). 
5. The original dates are 1947:10, 1955:09, 1968:12, 1974:04, 1978:08, and 1979:10. The date that they
added is 1988:12. 
6. The sample period used by Thorbecke (1997) extended from January 1967 to December 1995. 
7. In 1998 there were 11 million people employed in the durable goods sector, 6 million in construction,
and less than 600,000 in mining. 
8. The R-squared statistics for the white, black, and Hispanic unemployment equations are, respectively,
0.98, 0.97, and 0.92. The standard errors of the equations are, respectively, 0.17, 0.48, and 0.56. 
9. The results are similar when the levels of the unemployment rates are replaced in the VARs by rates
that are detrended or first- differenced. 